The previously best attack known on elliptic curve cryptosystems used in practice was the parallel collision search based on Pollard's -method. The complexity of this attack is the square root of the prime order of the generating point used. For arbitrary curves, typically de ned over GF(p) or GF(2 m ), the attack time can be reduced by a factor or p 2, a small improvement. For sub eld curves, those de ned over GF(2 ed ) with coe cients de ning the curve restricted to GF(2 e ), the attack time can be reduced by a factor of p 2d. In particular for curves over GF(2 m ) with coe cients in GF(2), called anomalous binary curves or Koblitz curves, the attack time can be reduced by a factor of p 2m.
Introduction
Public-key cryptography based on elliptic curves over nite elds was proposed by Miller 7] and Koblitz 5] in 1985. Elliptic curves over nite elds have been used to implement the Di e-Hellman key passing scheme 2, 4] and also the elliptic curve variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm 1, 8] . The security of these cryptosystems relies on the di culty of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. If P is a point with order n on an elliptic curve, and Q is some other point on the same curve, then the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is to determine an l such that Q = lP and 0 l n ? 1 if such an l exists. If this problem can be solved e ciently, then elliptic curve based cryptosystems can be broken e ciently.
The best attack known on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is parallel collision search 13] based on Pollard's algorithm 9] which has running time proportional to the square root of the largest prime factor dividing the curve order. This method works for any cyclic group and does not make use of any additional structure present in elliptic curve groups. We show how this method can be improved for any elliptic curve logarithm computation by exploiting the fact that the negative of a point can be computed very rapidly.
Certain classes of elliptic curves have been proposed for use in cryptography because of their ability to provide e ciencies in implementation. Among these have been sub eld curves and anomalous binary or Koblitz curves 6, 11] . Using the Frobenius endomorphism, we show that these curves also allow a further speed-up for the parallel collision search algorithm and therefore provide less security than was originally thought. This is the rst time that the extra structure provided by these curves has actually been used to attack the cryptosystems upon which they are based. Independant work in this area has also been performed by Robert Gallant, Robert Lambert and Scott Vanstone.
Background
This section will provide the necessary background material on various properties of elliptic curves and will also describe the parallel collision search method for computing discrete logarithms.
Elliptic Curves Over GF (p)
Let GF(p) be a nite eld of characteristic p 6 = 2; 3, and let a; b 2 GF(p) satisfy the inequality 4a together with a special point, O, called the point at in nity. These points form an abelian group under a well-de ned addition operation which we now describe.
Let E (a;b) (GF (p)) be an elliptic curve and let P and Q be two points on E (a;b) (GF (p)). If P = O, then ?P = O and P +Q = Q+P = Q. Let P = (x 1 ; y 1 ) and Q = (x 2 ; y 2 ). Then ?P = (x 1 ; ?y 1 ) and P + (?P ) = O. If Q 6 = ?P then P + Q = (x 3 ; y 3 ) where 
Elliptic Curves Over GF (2 m )
We now consider non-supersingular elliptic curves de ned over elds of characteristic 2. Let GF(2 m ) be such a eld for some m 1. Then a non-supersingular elliptic curve is de ned to be the set of solutions (x; y) 2 GF(2 m ) GF(2 m ) to the equation We denote this elliptic curve by E (a;b) (GF (2 m )) or (when the context is understood) E.
The points on an elliptic curve form an abelian group under a well de ned group operation. The identity of the group operation is the point O. For P = (x 1 ; y 1 ) a point on the curve, we de ne ?P to be (x 1 ; y 1 + x 1 ), so P+(-P)=(-P)+P=O. Now suppose P and Q are not O, and P 6 = ?Q. Let P be as above and Q = (x 2 ; y 2 ), then P + Q = ( 
The Frobenius Endomorphism
An interesting property of anomalous binary curves is that if P = (x; y) is a point on the curve, then so is (x 2 ; y 2 ). In fact (x 2 ; y 2 ) = P for some constant . We can see this in the general case of sub eld curves using the Frobenius endomorphism.
The Frobenius endomorphism is the function that takes x to x 2 e for all x 2 GF(2 m ). Since we are working in a eld of characteristic 2, notice that (r(x)) = r( (x)) for all x 2 GF(2 m ) and any rational function r with coe cients in GF(2 e ).
If P = (x; y) is a point on the sub eld curve E, de ne (P ) = ( (x); (y)). Also de ne (O) = O. It can be shown from the curve's de ning equation and the fact that (a + b) 2 e = a 2 e + b 2 e for all a; b 2 GF(2 e ) that if P 2 E then (P ) 2 E. Thus if E is a sub eld curve and P; Q 2 E, then (P + Q) = (P ) + (Q). Now, consider a point P 2 E where E is a sub eld curve and P has prime order p with p 2 6 j#E. By the above remarks we have p (P ) = (pP ) = (O) = O. Hence (P ) must also be a point of order P. Since (P ) 2 E, we must have (P ) = P for some 2 ZZ, 1 p?1. The value is constant among all points in the subgroup generated by P and is known as the eigenvalue of the Frobenius endomorphism.
It is known that for any point P 2 E, the Frobenius endomorphism satis es 2 (P ) ? t (P ) + 2 e P = O where t is the trace as de ned in Section 2.3. Therefore, it can also be shown that is one of the roots of the quadratic congruence X 2 ? tX + 2 e 0 (mod p):
Hence, can be e ciently computed.
Parallel Collision Search
Given a point Q on an elliptic curve which is in a subgroup of order n generated by P, we seek l such that Q = lP. Pollard Note that A i and B i can be computed modulo n so that they do not grow out of control. Because the number of points on the curve is nite, the sequence of points must begin to repeat. Upon detection that Z i = Z j we have A i P +b i Q = A j P +B j Q, which gives l = A i ?A j B j ?B i mod n, unless we are very unlucky and B i B j (mod n). The expected number of iterations required to nd the logarithm is q n 2 . The object of this paper is to reduce this number.
Faster Attacks for Arbitrary Curves
Notice that for elliptic curves over both GF(p) and GF(2 m ), given a point P = (x; y) on the curve it is trivial to determine its negative. Either ?P = (x; ?y) (in the GF(p) case) or ?P = (x; x + y) (in the GF(2 m ) case). Thus, at every stage of the parallel collision search algorithm, both Z i and ?Z i could be easily computed.
We would like to reduce the size of the space that is being searched by parallel collision search by a factor of 2. We can do this by replacing Z i with Z i at each step in a canonical way. A simple way to do this is to choose the one that has smallest y coordinate when its binary representation is interpreted as an integer.
When Thus, the search space for the parallel collision search is reduced to only those points which have a smaller y coordinate than their negative. Since exactly half of the points (6 = O) have this property we have reduced the search space by a factor of 2. Because the extra computational e ort in determining which of Z i and ?Z i to accept is negligible, the expected running time of the algorithm will be reduced by a factor of p 2. This improvement in attack time is valid for any elliptic curve. A technicality which a ects the most obvious application of this technique is the appearance of trivial 2-cycles. Suppose that Z i and Z i+1 both belong to the same S j and that in both cases after f is applied, the negative of the resulting point is used. This is when Z i+1 = ?(Z i + c j P + d j Q) (say) and Z i+2 = ?(Z i+1 + c j P + d j Q) = Z i . The occurrence of these 2-cycles is reduced by using the iteration function given in Equation (1) since it gives more choices for the multipliers. It does not reduce it enough so that e cient implementations are possible however. To reduce the occurrence of 2-cycles even further, we can use a look-ahead technique which proceeds as follows. De ne f w (Z) Z + c w P + d w Q. Suppose that Z i 2 S j . Then f(Z i ) = f j (Z i ). Begin by computing R = f j (Z i ), a candidate for Z i+1 . If R 6 2 S j then Z i+1 = R. If R 2 S j , then we treat Z i as though it were in S j+1 (where j + 1 is reduced modulo 20), and compute a new candidate R = f j+1 (Z i ). If R 6 2 S j+1 , then Z i+1 = R, otherwise continue trying j + 2; j + 3; : : :. If all 20 choices fail (a very low probability event), then just use Z i+1 = f j (Z i ). The idea is to reduce the probability that two successive points will belong to the same set. Note that Z i+1 still depends solely on Z i , a requirement for parallel collision search to work.
This modi ed iteration function causes the amount of computation to increase by an expected factor of approximately 20 19 , a small penalty which can be reduced by using more than 20 cases. The occurrence of 2-cycles is not completely eliminated, but is signi cantly reduced. If necessary, it can be reduced further by using more than 20 cases or by looking ahead two steps instead of just one. Another way to deal with 2-cycles is to consider them to be distinguished points.
Faster Attacks for Sub eld Curves
We will now describe an attack on sub eld curves that again uses parallel collision search and will reduce the running time by a factor of p d when considering curves over GF(2 ed ).
Let E (a;b) (GF (2 ed )) be a sub eld curve with a; b 2 GF(2 e ) and let P be a point on the curve such that not both coordinates are from a proper sub eld of GF(2 ed ).
In other words P 2 E (a;b) GF(2 ed ), but P 6 2 E (a;b) (GF (2 ef )) for any f, 1 f d?1.
Let P have prime order p such that p 2 does not divide the order of the curve and let d be odd. These conditions are not restrictive since most elliptic curve cryptosystems require the use of points P with prime order very close to the curve order, which usually implies the above conditions.
By these conditions we get that (P ) = P 6 = P; 2 (P ) = 2 P 6 = P;
. . . Remember that (x) = x 2 e . Since we are working over a sub eld of characteristic 2, squaring is always a very e cient operation. In particular when a normal basis representation is used, it is just a cyclic shift of the binary representation of the eld element. Thus (P ) can be computed very e ciently.
Similar to Section 3, we will use a parallel collision search and compute Z i , A i and B i as usual. We can now also compute the 2d di erent points on the curve j (Z i ) for 0 j d?1. We would like to choose a \distinguished" or \canonical" representative from this set. We will rst consider the d points j (Z i ) and use the one whose x coordinate's binary representation has smallest value when interpreted as an integer. We can then choose either that point or its negative depending on which has smaller y coordinate when interpreted as an integer. This point will now replace Z i . If we have chosen j (Z i ) to replace Z i , we must then replace A i with j A i and also replace B i with j B i to maintain the relationship Z i = A i P +B i Q.
The powers of j can be precomputed to obtain further e ciencies.
By performing the above operation at every step of the parallel collision search, we will be reducing the size of our search space by a factor of 2d. Thus, the expected running time to compute the discrete logarithm will decrease by a factor of p 2d.
The iteration function f used in the parallel collision search must be chosen carefully. In particular, notice that if the function is chosen to be a choice between just 2Z, Z + P and Z + Q (as in the basic parallel collision search algorithm), then in some situations trivial cycles are likely to occur. Notice that for i < j, Z j can be written as Z j = p 1 ( )Z i +p 2 ( )P +p 3 ( )Q where p 1 , p 2 and p 3 are polynomials in .
Also notice that these polynomials will have small coe cients if j ? i is not too big.
When using anomalous binary curves, the value satis es 2 + + 2 or 2 ? + 2.
In either case, will be likely to be a root of the polynomials in the expression for Z j , and hence a trivial cycle will be encountered. Experimentation shows that the modi ed iteration function described in Section 3 reduces the occurrences of these trivial cycles su ciently for practical purposes.
Anomalous Binary Curves
Now consider the situation created by using anomalous binary curves. If E (a;b) (GF (2 m )) is such a curve, then a; b 2 f0; 1g, so we are actually using sub eld curves with e = 1 and d = m.
These curves are particularly well suited to this attack because the size of the space searched is reduced by a factor of 2m, which reduces the expected running time by a factor of p 2m. Thus the attacks on anomalous binary curves using this method are the most e cient among all sub eld curves.
As an example, consider the anomalous binary curve E (1;1) (GF (2 163 )). This curve has been considered particularly attractive for implementing elliptic curve cryptosystems since its order is twice a prime close to 2 
E ciency Considerations
It has been shown that the number of group operations required to perform an elliptic curve logarithm can be reduced, but this is not much good if too much added computation is required in each step. In this section we show how to keep subtractions modulo n, additions modulo d and sign changes. This is much cheaper than an elliptic curve addition and is not a signi cant part of the algorithm run-time.
We implemented these ideas on the anomalous binary curve E (0;1) (GF (2 41 )). The iteration function used 20 multipliers and used the look-ahead scheme described in Section 3. Over 15 trials, the experimental run-times were consistent with the expected run-time of q ( =2)2 41 2 41 . 6 Other Attempts at Using Frobenius Another way that one might try to take advantage of the Frobenius endomorphism is to use parallel collision search as usual, but to check whether any stored distinguished points are negatives of each other or can be mapped to each other with the Frobenius endomorphism. This is easiest when using a method for choosing distinguished points which leaves a point distinguished if the Frobenius map is applied.
Unfortunately, this approach will not work unless the iteration function is carefully chosen so that all members of one equivalence class map to the same new equivalence class. The principle behind parallel collision search is that each distinguished point stands for the entire set of points in the trail leading to the distinguished point. A collision occurs because one trail runs into another trail and is lead to the common distinguished point. When a collision occurs and is detected, the two distinguished points are identical. The probability of encountering two unequal distinguished points which have a Frobenius map and/or negation map is very low.
Another way to think of this is that the iteration function acts as a random mapping and not all distinguished points are equally likely to appear. In fact, distinguished points tend to have radically di erent sized tree structures leading into them. The conditional probabilities are such that if a distinguished point occurs, it is very likely to have a large tree structure leading into it, making it a likely candidate to appear again. However, the distinguished points which are Frobenius and/or negation maps of the one which has occurred are not likely to have large tree structures.
Conclusion
Sub eld and anomalous binary curves have been attractive to cryptographers for quite some time because of the e ciencies they provide both in curve generation and in the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. There have also been unsubstantiated warnings for quite some time that these curves may be more open to attack because of the greater structure that these curves have. The results of this paper show that this structure can in fact be used to obtain faster attacks. While the attack presented here still has a fully exponential running time, care should be exercised when choosing these curves regarding their expected security level. In certain circumstances these curves may still be attractive because of their e ciencies with respect to curves of similar security levels.
These results highlight the fact that more research must be done on the cryptanalysis of elliptic curve cryptosystems before we can be fully con dent of the security level di erent curves o er. Two open questions remain:
Can the ideas presented here be used, possibly in combination with other methods to reduce the attack time further? Can similar ideas be applied to other classes of curves or to curves whose coe cients do not lie in the sub eld?
